Locating EC Environmental Law by McGillivray, Donald & Holder, Jane
Kent Academic Repository – Kent Law School 
Published version available in ’20 Yearbook of European Law 139-171’ 
- 1 - 
 
 
Locating EC Environmental Law  




Yearbook of European Law, 20 (2001), 139-171  
 
Not Published Version 
 
  
Abstract: Despite prognoses of marginalisation, European Community environmental 
law has been strengthened, both through Treaty developments, revitalisation 
of secondary legislation and purposive judgments of the European Court.  
Concepts once confined to its Environmental Title, such as subsidiarity and 
integrating environmental considerations into other policy areas, now 
govern the Community as a whole, being joined and strengthened in this by 
the new Community objective of promoting sustainable development.  This 
article charts the evolution of these concepts, in effect the ‘greening’ of EC 
governance, and also explores the extent to which a mainstream European 
concept, citizenship, might in turn be greened.  The article argues that 
sustainable development considerations are emerging as a central organising 
rationale for the Community as a whole.  However, EC ‘sustainable 
development’ law continues insufficiently to capture environmental values 
or extended environmental meanings (such as of ‘the European Union’s 
environment’), and fails to overcome many of the central difficulties 
associated with the earlier development of the Community’s 
‘environmental’ jurisprudence. 
Keywords:  EC law, environmental law, the European Union environment, sustainable 





From its initial absence from the EEC Treaty, both formally and in practice, environmental 
policy has moved centre stage in the EC Treaty.  In certain key respects, this development 
has been further strengthened by judgments of the European Court of Justice and by the 
European Union’s international action in this field.  Most recently, the Treaty of Amsterdam 
has altered the objectives of the Community, making the promotion of the core 
environmental concept of ‘sustainable development’ a central objective of the revised EC 
Treaty.i In short, environmental law has now become a structured and embedded body of 
Community law, a development further reinforced by the extent to which, as a discipline, 
European environmental law and policy is now firmly on the academic map.ii 
The purpose of this article is to examine this evolution, locating environmental law within 
the development of EC law more generally.  In this context, however, we also consider the 
use of environmental law to further other objectives of the EU.  Our focus, therefore, is the 
development and application of certain principles with an environmental heritage - 
sustainable development, integration and subsidiarity.  The current centrality of these 
principles in the EC Treaty tells a story of the absorption of the ideas and language of 
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environmental policy into the core of the EU’s constitution and policy formation processes: 
the ‘ecologisation’ of European governance.iii  We also identify the application of concepts 
from the Community’s traditional core areas of competence in social and economic 
matters to the environmental field, most notably citizenship, which has been tagged an 
example of the ‘mainstreaming’ of environmental policy.iv  
In considering these legal cross-currents, and law’s part in furthering and strengthening 
ideas and values via principles, the main theme is the extent to which recent 
developments in EC environmental law pose new challenges to legal doctrines and to 
institutional structures which at present are only uneasily accommodated within existing 
frameworks. Most early, ‘first-generation’, Community environmental legislation arose 
immanently in response to economic law, flanking the market alongside social law.  Its 
accommodation within EC law, legislatively and in judgments of the Court of Justice,v 
proved to be, on the whole, relatively unproblematic.vi  A central reason behind the 
smoothness of this evolution was the emergence of Community environmental law, that is 
law aimed at the improved management of the environment and of natural resources and 
firmly anthropocentric in orientation, rather than the emergence at EC level of what might 
be termed ecological law, stressing the inter-relationship of humans and their natural 
environment.vii 
The recent borrowing of principles with an environmental heritage suggests that 
environmental law is further embedded in the EU’s legal core.  However, in this process 
the principles undergo some change in their role and content.  Similarly, elements of 
citizenship may be ‘greened’, but not without significant broadening of the concept.  In this 
sense, environmental law at EC level reflects many of the inherent limitations in regulating 
for positive environmental change, such as adequate representation of environmental 
interests and the capture of environmental values in decision-making.viii  However, there 
are also limitations specific to the EC context, notably the inadequacy of an environmental 
agenda within undeveloped areas of EC law such as citizenship, notwithstanding that the 
EC provides a forum for the mediation of a range of conflicts relating to the balancing of 
environmental and other interests, primarily trade.  We may therefore be entering a phase 
in which some of the limits of EC environmental law are being reached, and significant 
challenges to an ‘environmental’ approach emerging. 
The article is broadly structured in three parts.  In the next section, we outline what is 
meant by the European environment, as the subject of the body of Community 
environmental law.  We examine the idea that ‘the European Union’s environment’ (the 
working term of the European Environment Agency) is contestableix - the environment is, 
after all, a many faceted, variable and uncertain thing - and consider the part played by 
law in the construction of this idea by highlighting various legal representations of the 
environment.  The most important, for the purposes of this article, is the idea of the 
European environment as a common natural heritage which has currency as 
representative of a united and integrated Europe.  Thereafter, the following three sections 
consider those principles and concepts with an environmental heritage, and the impact of 
their upward march within the EC Treaty regime.  Finally, in what is a necessarily more 
speculative section, we consider some of the issues which arise when Community 
environmental law is examined under the lens of EU citizenship. 
 
The nature of ‘the European Union’s environment’ 
‘The European Union’s environment’ is a central term of reference of the European 
Environment Agency.x  The Agency has, for example, recently attempted to assess the 
state of the European environment coupled with predictions about its future quality.xi  The 
environment, as portrayed in these reports, is a cluster of ‘environmental issues.’xii  Prime 
amongst these is the quality of air, water and soil.  Considerable importance is also placed 
on the relationship between environmental quality and human health, an emphasis 
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reflected in several of the judgments of the European Court of Justice.  This suggests that 
this environment - its boundaries, characteristics, inhabitants - is a given.  This essentialist 
idea, however, belies considerable complexity and uncertainty.  Many different 
environments exist - urban,xiii wilderness, the indoor environment evenxiv - and the 
environment might be understood or experienced on different spatial and temporal 
scales,xv with the added capacity to change, albeit slowly.xvi 
The terms of reference and methodology of the European Environment Agency can be 
seen as limiting, particularly its apparent failure to capture more complex, extended 
understandings of environment, shaped by culture and tradition.xvii  Arguably, it is through 
appreciation of such understandings that a real and recognisable change in the quality of 
‘the environment’ might be engendered.xviii  Short of this, the approach taken continues to 
emphasise quantitative data, along which lines the Agency has recently published its first 
set of environmental indicators,xix a precursor to their elevation in the Community’s Sixth 
Environmental Action Programme.xx  It is worth stressing that the indicators being 
advanced at Community level go beyond air and water quality and other traditional 
environmental sectors such as waste management and ozone depletion to encompass 
indicators relating to key sectors of the economy and their integration: agriculture, energy, 
transport and industry (tourism being the one, notable, exception).xxi  Nevertheless, the 
indicators are still environmental in the sense that they do not reach beyond environmental 
issues to try to capture more general ‘sustainable development’ indicators, the position 
recently taken in the UK (although these might be criticised as going too far in the direction 
of subjective ‘quality of life’ indicators and thus unduly relegating ecological 
considerations).xxii  A more general difficulty with indicators is that even where there is 
agreement on the factors to be measured, agreeing on the seriousness of the problem is 
necessarily subjective.xxiii  
There are also difficulties with the idea of a European environment. ‘Europe’ is not an 
identifiable bioregion (a discrete natural region defined according to the lay of the land)xxiv 
and the physical boundaries of Europe are not settled because of the accession of new 
Member States, and the variability of the European Economic Area and the European 
Agreements.  The future accession of Central and Eastern European states in particular 
will radically alter the territory of the EC (and is likely to multiply the sorts of environmental 
problems which followed the reunification of Germany).xxv  There is also an element of 
extraterritoriality: for example, the European Environment Agency includes Norway and 
other states within its scope, recognising that for some purposes the ‘European 
environment’ extends eastwards to Belarus.xxvi 
The legal representation of the environment in the EC Treaty and secondary legislation 
has also been similarly limited and partial, in terms of its content and premises.  Most 
significantly an anthropocentric agenda for environmental protection is pursued, so that 
the focus of EC environmental law is on protecting the health of humans and certain 
‘useful’ or valued animals (whales, seal pups, and certain other (fur-producing) 
mammals)xxvii rather than protecting the environment for its own sake.  This is seen by the 
legal marginalisation of the issue of eutrophication of waters, when compared to the 
emphasis placed on safe drinking water.xxviii  And, more generally within water policy, a 
‘suitable for use’ formulation has been the rule, combined with standards for various water 
uses, rather than rights or entitlements to water of a particular quality.xxix  This agenda is 
also striking in the case of the Habitats Directive,xxx in which the destruction of a habitat for 
‘development’ is provided for, so long as certain procedural requirements are fulfilled.xxxi  
This demonstrates clearly the institutional strains at work which force the institutions of the 
Community (and in particular the Court of Justice) to fit environmental problems into a 
human welfare framework. 
The heritage of the anthropocentric agenda in the EC is in the emphasis on the ‘Human 
Environment’ in the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference in 1972 
which prompted action on the part of the European Economic Community.xxxii The 
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constraints of Article 235 of the EEC Treatyxxxiii (a legal base for Community action on the 
environment before 1986) also contributed to this.xxxiv  Legal measures adopted under this 
Article were to attain ‘in the course of the operation of the common market one of the 
objectives of the Community’.  In the case of environmental measures, this objective was 
interpreted as improving the living and working conditions of the peoples of Europe.  
‘Purer’ environmental objectives which were expressed in some of the early policy 
documents, action programmes, and legislationxxxv were therefore fitted within the 
constraints of, in policy terms, a conservative European Economic Community.  Whilst ex 
Article 235 EEC (now Article 308 EC) has been regarded generally as an all-embracing 
legal base, ‘a true locus of expansion’,xxxvi in the environmental field it restricted the type 
and content of legislation. 
There are clearly gaps in the substantive law most notably in areas such as remedying the 
problem of historically contaminated land.xxxvii  These might be attributed to subsidiarity-
related issues concerning the proper level of regulation.  They might also be explained by 
reason of the importance of Member States’ control over land and energy, as symbols of 
sovereignty and self-sufficiency,xxxviii although there is a qualification in that EC 
environmental law acts upon those areas of the environment which are perceived as least 
economically vital, typically nature conservation.  Even allowing for these explanations, 
however, certain omissions in EC environmental law derived from its anthropocentric 
orientation underlie the central philosophical and political distinction between 
‘environmentalists’ who adopt a technicist and often managerial stance towards the 
environment and ‘ecologists’ who view human activities as embedded in nature, and 
bioregions as determinative of action, government, and law.xxxix  Although the distinction 
between the two extremes is often exaggerated, it is important to recognise that, in its 
purpose, content, and scale, EC environmental law is an implicit rejection of ecological 
thought.  This might be supported by reference to limited legislative action so far in areas 
such as strategic environmental assessment, providing for an assessment of the 
environmental effects of certain plans and programmes (but not policies).xl  
The scope of EC environmental law may also be illustrated by the reasons on which 
regulation is premised.  Alongside economic spillovers and the pursuit of a 'level playing 
field' across the Community, the transboundary movement both of pollutants and of 
pollution was a key justification for early community law.xli  In recognising the irrelevance of 
borders in such cases, the 'environment' acted as a symbol for the advantages of joint 
action in Europe; the environmental agenda corresponding well with the idea of the EU ‘as 
a polity which transcends state boundaries’.xlii  More recently, a greater sensitivity to actual 
cross-border dimensions to environmental harm and its regulation is emerging, evidenced 
for example by cross-frontier consultation requirements now contained in revisions to the 
leading directives on environmental impact assessment, ambient air quality assessment 
and management, and the control of major accident hazards, and in the water framework 
directive.xliii 
With a different emphasis, however, EC environmental law is now developing the idea of 
shared heritage of the European environment.  This is a more complex but possibly firmer 
foundation for environmental law than the regulation of transboundary pollutants and 
pollution.  It has found expression not merely in legislation but also in judgments of the 
Court of Justice.  The shift towards a more inclusive, less functional premise for 
environmental law may first be seen in cases in which the Court’s interpretation of air 
quality Directives had the effect of giving individual citizens a right to clean air.xliv   This has 
been lauded as the first stirrings of a public environmental ‘trust’,xlv although in a limited 
form for enforcement purposes rather than as part of a broader citizenship agenda.xlvi  
Since then, the Court of Justice in Lappel Bank has reinforced that the Wild Birds Directive 
accords protection to species constituting ‘a common heritage of the Community’,xlvii an 
aspect of the Directive found to be capable of subjugating the national interest element of 
land use.xlviii  Recognising this, the Court sought to deny the significance of territoriality 
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rather than affirming it as in previous cases such as Red Grouse in which the Court of 
Justice held that the Netherlands could not ban local sales of birds killed legally in other 
Member States if they were neither migratory nor endangered within the meaning of the 
Directive.xlix  In this respect, the Court pursued an ecological objective, but this is not the 
general approach of the EU.  More important is the Court’s broadening of the language of 
the Directive, which speaks of ‘such species … constitut[ing] a common heritage’.  The 
Court may here reflect a widening of the language of commonality found in the preamble 
to the Habitats Directive (‘the threatened habitats and species form part of the 
Community’s natural heritage’)l and more broadly the absorption of the concept of 
‘commons’ from international environmental law.  Pursuing this idea in Lappel Bank, the 
Court spoke the language of integration - of common ownership of a Europe without 
borders in a real sense and common responsibilities. This idea, in law, of shared 
ownership of the European environment, is central to its legitimating force. The Court 
appears reluctant, however, to refer to commonality in relation to other environmental 
resources.li  This may be indicative of the problematic limits of a shared ownership 




Following the Treaty of Amsterdam, the international principle of sustainable development 
now forms part of the Community’s raison d’être in Article 2 EC: ‘Determined to promote 
economic and social progress for their peoples, taking into account the principle of 
sustainable development and within the context of the accomplishment of the internal 
market’.  The principle has also been added to the Treaty on European Union so that 
amongst the objectives of the Union is now listed: ‘to promote economic and social progress 
and to achieve balanced and sustainable development’.lii  The principle therefore provides a 
foundation for EC action in general rather than a more limited field of application, the 
formation of environmental law and policy.   
The principle of sustainable development can be traced to the 1972 United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, but gained currency in the 1987 
Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (the ‘Brundtland Report’) 
which defined it as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’.liii  The inclusion of sustainable 
development in the EC Treaty thereby introduces for the first time an intergenerational 
element into EC law. The centrality of the principle in the Union’s treaties may be seen 
primarily as a response to the Member States adopting sustainable development as a guiding 
principle in national legislation and policy documents, thereby discharging their obligations 
under international law.liv It is also a testament to the persistent and effective lobbying by 
bodies such as Greenpeace International, the Institute for European Environment Policy, the 
European Environmental Bureau, Friends of the Earth and WWF (formerly the World Wide 
Fund for Nature).lv   
Although its firm position in the EC legal order suggests some consensus about its meaning 
and significance, sustainable development is a deeply contested concept.lvi  This is not least 
because of the ‘business as usual’ philosophy, expressed in the Brundtland Reportlvii and 
close association with ‘environmental modernisation’ in which an efficiency oriented approach 
is pursued, and economic and environmental interests are purportedly integrated into 
decision-making in such so-called ‘win-win’ solutions.  In other words, this is an approach 
which sees environmental protection as less of a threat to the economy than an opportunity, 
and advocates the integration of environmental factors and interests into broader decision-
making, so far at the cost of a more overtly ecological approach.lviii  The principle of 
sustainable development thereby provides a continued link with economic priorities, even at a 
time when the EC Treatylix and certain judgments of the Court of Justice portray a decoupling 
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of environmental policy from its traditional economic base.lx  This economic orientation of the 
principle may be seen in the continued retention in the EC Treaty of terminology derived from 
the Treaty on European Union (‘sustainable growth’).lxi This points to Community adherence 
to the ‘weak’ version of sustainable development generally preferred by governments of the 
Member States.  In other words, sustainable development provides an environmental 
example of the familiar combination of the aspirational and the pragmatic which has 
characterised the evolution of Community law more generally. 
Legal definitions of the concept of sustainable development as a matter of European law are 
few, and the term is not directly defined in the EC Treaty.  However, recent proposals on 
supporting environmental integration in developing countries attempt to put some flesh on the 
bones.  Thus, recent changes to replace the Regulation on environmental measures in 
developing countries in the context of sustainable developmentlxii provide that: ‘"sustainable 
development” means the improvement of the standard of living and welfare of the relevant 
populations within the limits of the capacity of the ecosystems by maintaining natural assets 
and their biological diversity for the benefit of present and future generations’.lxiii  This 
approach elevates the notion of environmental limits in a quite different manner to that taken 
in the EC Treaty, which speaks instead of one objective of Community environmental policy 
being the ‘prudent and rational use of natural resources’.lxiv  It is evident that different aspects 
of sustainable development are being played out in different contexts in what appears to be a 
quite deliberate manner.lxv 
Short of the Treaty itself fleshing out what sustainable development, or ‘sustainability’, is, the 
Court of Justice has declined to look to such guidance as is found in the Community's 
environmental action programmes, most recently the definition offered in Towards 
Sustainability.lxvi And, in cases in which issues of sustainability are at their core, for example 
on the interpretation of the Directive on environmental assessment,lxvii the Court of Justice 
has adopted a purposive approach, referring to the necessity of interpreting the Directive so 
as to confer a high level of environmental protection, but has failed to explain this in terms of 
‘operationalising’ sustainable development.lxviii  This may be compared with the approach 
adopted by the International Court of Justice,lxix and to some extent the approach of the 
Commission at a policy level.lxx  However, A-G Léger’s Opinion in First Corporate Shippinglxxi 
may represent something of a development in terms of the Court of Justice’s 
conceptualisation of sustainable development.  The Opinion aligns the aim of the Habitats 
Directive with sustainable development.  Drawing on the Directive’s preamble (which 
describes the Directive as making a contribution to the general objective of sustainable 
development) the Advocate General considers that sustainable development ‘emphasises 
the necessary balance between various interests which sometimes clash, but which must be 
reconciled’.  This assisted in reaching the conclusion that in deciding which sites to propose 
or when defining the boundaries of such sites for the purposes of the Habitats Directive, the 
Commission (in agreement with the Member States) must assess the interests concerned, 
ascertaining whether human activities in the area may be reconciled with the objective of 
biodiversity conservation.  While the Court was able to dispose of the case on narrower 
grounds without discussing sustainability, this view represents a considerable departure from 
the ECJ's case law on the Wild Birds Directive which consistently held that only objective 
ornithological criteria could be used in designating bird habitat sites for protection.lxxii 
The apparent lacuna in the Court of Justice’s handling of the principle might be explained by 
its relatively recent addition to the Union Treatieslxxiii and its close identification with policy 
formation, rather than as a justiciable source of rights.  It is indeed policy making that 
sustainable development is likely to influence further, for example in the direction of an 
overarching ‘First Sustainable Development Strategic Forum’ embracing also the 
development of a Sixth EC Environmental Action Programme.lxxiv 
 
Integration 
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An imperative of sustainable development is the integration of environmental protection 
requirements into the social and economic dimensions of other policy areas.  This suggests 
the desirability of recognising existing connections and fostering interrelations between 
Community institutions and the Member States, to reduce the possibility of the environment 
being discounted or marginalised in decision making.  Whilst integration provides a template 
for the development of the EU as a whole, and integration clauses in the EC Treaty refer to 
areas other than environmental policy,lxxv it has particular significance in the environmental 
field.  This is because of the environmentalist’s argument that environmental protection 
requirements should necessarily form part of all areas of life.lxxvi Integration therefore provides 
a mechanism whereby the linkages between the social, economic and environmental 
spheres, identified by sustainable development, may be acted upon.lxxvii 
Even in the absence of an integration principle, the Community has for some time been 
regarded as a space for the important integration of valued objectives.  Most notably, there 
were relatively early attempts at integrating environmental considerations into regional policy, 
although these are still the subject of fierce criticism.lxxviii  However, the central locus of 
integration has been through the Court of Justice holding environmental protection to be a 
mandatory requirement justifying restrictions to the free circulation of goods under Article 28 
EC (ex Article 30) where indistinctly applicable measures are taken.lxxix  The judicial creation 
of mandatory requirements has overcome some of the limitations inherent in Article 30 EC 
(ex Article 36) of the Treaty which, despite pressure for change at the pre-Amsterdam 
Intergovernmental Conference, continues to exclude environmental protection objectives 
from its list of justifiable prohibitions.  A glimmer of hope for the reinterpretation of what are 
essentially sanitary and agricultural protections, however, can be seen in Bluhme.lxxx  There, 
the Court of Justice held that a national legislative measure prohibiting the keeping on a 
Danish island of a species of bee other than the native subspecies must be regarded as 
justified, under Article 30 EC, on the ground of the protection of the health and life of animals, 
thus elevating biodiversity conservation through protection of the life of potentially affected 
species.  However, the judgment goes further still by allowing trade-related protection for 
local colonies of species regardless of whether such a colony might be deemed a distinct 
species or subspecies.  So long as the population affected has characteristics distinguishing 
it from others, this makes it worthy of protection, not merely from a scientific perspective but 
perhaps also for its cultural significance.  Cases such as Bluhme highlight that the Court at 
least provides a unified forum for the resolution of conflicts between trade and environment, 
even if its rules on standing still serve to exclude certain environmental voiceslxxxi and the 
actual resolution of trade and environmental objectives remains elusive.lxxxii 
A more certain approach to integration, less reliant on litigation which continues to favour 
trade-related interests,lxxxiii may flow from the application of a legal principle of integration, the 
heritage of which is in the Environment Title of the EEC Treaty,lxxxiv inserted by the Single 
European Act 1986.  This was subtly strengthened by the Treaty on European Union 
1992.lxxxv The Treaty of Amsterdam further enhanced the principle by elevating it to a general 
principle of the EC Treaty, banishing any view that it applied only to ‘other [explicitly 
mentioned] Community policies’, and twinning it with sustainable development.lxxxvi  Although 
undoubtedly strengthened over time (suggesting that it has been seen as increasingly 
significant, or, perhaps, in need of clarification), the forms of integration relate mainly to the 
integration of policy areas and the promulgation of ‘horizontal’ or cross-media legislation.  A 
legal analysis of the principle, however, suggests that integration is primarily a procedural 
requirement.lxxxvii  Although not purely exhortatory,lxxxviii neither is it clearly justiciable.lxxxix  And, 
although the legal status of the principle of integration has been debated in disputes over the 
legal base of a measure,xc questions remain as to whether the principle may constrain 
Community activities which fail to reflect the integration concept, or require positive steps to 
be taken.xci  Beyond limited hard legal effect, therefore, the elevation of the integration 
principle in the EC Treaty has been felt most at the policy and institutional level.  Thus, it has 
imposed an obligation on the part of the Directorates-General to consider environmental 
protection requirements as part of their respective policy areas.  Triggered by the Cardiff 
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European Summit,xcii there is an expanding number of discussion documents that pertain to 
‘integrate’ the environment into other policy areas.  These adopt either a bilateral approach to 
integration (i.e., the integration of `the environment' into a specific sector),xciii or, increasingly, 
a multilateral approach whereby more complex and complete patterns of co-operation are 
evolving.xciv   Elsewhere, it has led to a range of institutional developments such as 
designated environmental liaison officials in other Directorates-General, in effect a lukewarm 
version of the Greening Government initiative in the UK.xcv 
Legislation with an avowedly integrationist intent has ensued.  One recent example is 
Regulation 1257/99 on support for rural developmentxcvi which, by strengthening agri-
environmental measures, attempts to integrate environmental concerns into the Common 
Agricultural Policy under the Agenda 2000 reform process.  However, such reforms should 
perhaps be seen as performing a legitimating function for the purpose of excluding, or ‘green-
boxing’, agricultural grants and subsidies from the purview of the World Trade Organisation.  
A further category of integrationist measure relates not to the internal procedures of the 
Community institutions, but rather aims to more fully integrate decision making in the Member 
States.  The Directive on project-based environmental assessment is an early example.  A 
more fully developed approach to assessment is taken in the recent proposals on strategic 
environmental assessment, noted above.xcvii  In similar vein, attached to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam is a Declarationxcviii that ‘the Commission undertakes in its proposals, and that the 
Member States undertake in implementing those proposals, to take full account of their 
environmental impact and of the principle of sustainable growth’.  However, this falls some 
way short of a requirement that impact assessment be carried out and is notable for its 
reference to ‘growth’ rather than ‘development’. 
Elsewhere, the Directive on integrated pollution prevention and control offers an example of 
the advantages and potential scope of an integrated approach.xcix  As well as rejecting a 
media-based approach to pollution control, which is itself the antithesis of an integrated 
approach, the Directive reflects a recognition that integrated pollution control requires the 
regulation of ‘inputs’ as well as ‘outputs’, namely energy and natural resources, giving it 
certain qualities relating as much to environmental management as to environmental 
protection.c  The inclusion of some agricultural processes within the Directive’s scope further 
suggests some progression towards a more holistic approach to the environment.  A similarly 
holistic approach is also evident in the Water Framework Directiveci, which links water quality 
and quantity objectives, although takes an insufficiently integrated approach, e.g., energy 
consumption in meeting water quality standards is not addressed. 
There has therefore been much action in terms of documentation and some notable 
examples of directives taking an integrationist approach.cii  But, taking a broad view, there are 
few identifiable, ‘hard’ consequences of the principle in terms of decision making.  The 
decision to proceed with the completion of the internal market, without any rigorous 
examination of the likely effects on the environment, ciii is one example, such that the policy 
decisions on the bolsters to the single market, such as the trans-European network, may be 
seen as examples of profound ‘disintegration’.civ  Perhaps most significant is research that 
suggests that the moves towards greater integration of policy areas can actually lead to 
marginalisation of the environmental agenda, and non-environmental interests and 
considerations influencing environmental interests as much as vice versa.cv Arguably, the 
proliferation of integration duties may weaken the concept such that the environment loses 
any distinctive legal status in the Treaty.cvi 
 
Subsidiarity 
The third principle we consider in the context of the greening of EU governance is 
subsidiarity, a version of which was included in the Environmental Title following the Single 
European Actcvii before the principle gained more general legal currency at Maastricht. 
Like other provisions of the SEA relating to the environment, however, the insertion of a 
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subsidiarity-type provision confirmed and legitimated existing practice, in this case 
entrenching (albeit to a limited extent) an existing sensitivity to questions of scale.  Thus, 
the First Environmental Action Programme referred to five possible levels of action – local, 
regional, national, European, international - and the need ‘to establish the level best suited 
to the type of pollution and to the geographical zone to be protected’.cviii  Of course, for 
some Member States at least, the initial insertion of a subsidiarity-type provision in the 
EEC Treaty was to prevent an undesirable extension of Community competence rather 
than anything with wider impact.cix 
The more general subsidiarity provision inserted at Maastricht reflects a concern with the 
appropriate level of decision-making.  This, as with the version of subsidiarity originally 
contained in Article 130r(4) of the EEC, again juxtaposes Community and Member State 
action, using 'effectiveness' as its true measure.cx  Necessarily this has implications for 
values related to processes rather than outcomes.cxi  Thus while there are a number of 
provisions of EC environmental law which require or promote a measure of public 
involvement, a difficulty is that this occurs against a background in which procedural 
values are fundamentally downplayed.cxii  A further implication is that the approach in 
Article 5 EC (ex Article 3b), which conspicuously eschews the citizen-centred approach to 
subsidiarity taken in Article 1 of the TEU (ex Art. A), blocks out an important conceptual 
space for the ecological citizen, avoiding consideration of the local or the ‘domestic’ as 
worthy of Treaty-based protection.cxiii  In any event, the fluid boundaries of environmental 
law, and in particular moves to integrate environmental concerns into other policy sectors, 
pose a particular challenge to the idea of a strict division between exclusive and shared 
competence.cxiv  This is further complicated by the difficulty, in the environmental sphere 
as elsewhere, of drawing sharp distinctions between the local and the global and all points 
in between. 
In addition, continuing attention to effectiveness of outcome clashes not merely with other 
valuable aspects of regulation, such as process values, but also with the realities of 
existing EC environmental law.  Many new environmental measures move away from 
traditional ‘command and control’ regulation and are difficult to judge on normal 
‘effectiveness of outcome’ grounds.  Recent amendments to the Directive on 
environmental impact assessment, for example, retain its procedurally-focused 
mechanisms based on preventing adverse environmental impact at source, although the 
Directive is not directly assessed against this objective, either quantitatively or 
qualitatively.cxv  On the other hand, while the economic costs and benefits of taking action 
at EC level are captured in the Commission’s fiches d’impact, political values grounded on 
more aspirational environmental objectives may in practice prove to be overriding.cxvi 
Because subsidiarity-type concerns related to ‘who does what’ have always influenced 
environmental policy, Treaty-based provisions have impacted most in relation to ‘what it is 
they actually do’, conflating subsidiarity with pressures towards deregulation.cxvii While the 
pace of new environmental legislation undoubtedly slowed following completion of the 
internal market, and some inert proposals were, for the time being, withdrawn, the greatest 
impact has been the subtle reorientation of new proposals towards greater flexibility.  This 
is seen most clearly in the exercise of discretion, primarily at national level, and both 
legislatively and judicially: changes to the form and intensity of legislation, and a greater 
willingness to apply and interpret this flexibly and to bolster this approach through a 
preference for decentralised enforcement methods.cxviii  Nevertheless, the general 
endurability of existing EC environmental legislation and proposals for new law is striking.  
Central to this have been the pre-existing twin sensitivities to issues of scale in decision-
making, as well as leaving the details of the balancing of environmental and other 
objectives to the Member States.cxix 
More specifically, many directives identified as requiring simplification in the post-
Maastricht period (especially those relating to air and water quality standards) have been 
renewed or are close to revision, albeit that they are subject in differing respects to 
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subsidiarity.  For example, there has been some shift in the Directive on drinking water 
quality towards regulating only for essential quality and health-related parameters, while 
Member States are to be given greater flexibility in monitoring water quality.cxx  Current 
thinking on amending the Directive on bathing waters might, for the first time, make distinct 
provision for different waters depending on natural differences in, e.g., pH, turbidity and 
salinity, requiring standards to be set with respect to what is ‘normal’, which will vary 
across the Community.cxxi  This approach would take differences in environmental 
assimilative capacities seriously while, in theory, providing for common minimum health 
and amenity standards.  And in relation to air quality, the adoption of the Directive on 
ambient air quality assessment and managementcxxii has put to rest concerns that the 
Community had, by the mid-1990s, abandoned, at least temporarily, recourse to quality 
objectives in this sector in favour of emissions standards, seemingly because of the 
greater flexibility afforded by process-based controls.cxxiii   
In addition, controversial provisions of existing Directives in these key policy areas have, 
for a range of reasons, endured.  These include the background presence of international 
commitments or exhortatory standards, such as the role of World Health Organisation 
standards in guiding drinking water and air quality law, but probably also include the 
impact of the precautionary principle in entrenching existing provisions of environmental 
legislation which might not otherwise remain.  Finally, renewed commitment to existing 
policy areas involves little risk of losing symbolic capital. Similarly, new legislation has 
been adopted, or proposals remain active, in every key area where, post-Maastricht, at 
least some Member States were actively hostile to legislative development.cxxiv  Notable 
here is the adoption of Directives on packaging waste and landfills,cxxv and the prospect of 
legislation on strategic environmental assessmentcxxvi and environmental liability.cxxvii  Even 
a Directive on zoo animals has emerged, albeit one concerned with the contribution of 
zoos to public education about biodiversity conservation rather than welfare concerns,cxxviii 
illustrating continuing ambiguities in the Community’s involvement in animal welfare.cxxix 
While generalisations are problematic, some trends seem to emerge.  Firstly, minimum 
harmonisation remains the preference, while the scope for Member States to maintain or 
adopt higher national standards will, in practice, increase.cxxx  Linked with this, genuinely 
‘framework’ directives have yet to emerge, although the Water Framework Directive will 
alter this. (Whilst its pursuit of water quality of ‘good ecological status’ may prove elusive, 
its problematic approach combining emissions and quality standardscxxxi is accompanied 
by a no deterioration provision which, in principle, should mean no weakening of existing 
provisions.) A continued use of framework directives in the sense of ‘umbrella’ directives 
providing a general basis for more detailed controls, however, can be seen in the air 
quality sector, with ‘daughter’ directives finally emerging.cxxxii  
Secondly, Member States' discretion at the stage of implementation persists, although 
procedural constraints may be attached.  Time-limited derogations to particularly affected 
Member States continue to be used, while central regulatory terms are left undefined or 
intentionally vague.cxxxiii  More generally, a narrow view of taking local environmental 
conditions into account is emerging more explicitly, even if this is within procedurally 
constrained parameters.cxxxiv  This approach looks to physical environmental features 
rather than situatedness or ‘closeness to the citizen’.  Further, a divergence is emerging in 
relation to measures requiring the designation of sites and the application of protective 
regimes for pollution control therein, an approach traditionally seen as something of a 
halfway house between emission and target standards.  This is the approach taken under 
the Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive, under which areas sensitive to sewage 
effluent discharge must be designated and the courts have given Member States little 
discretion is doing so.cxxxv   In another area the Court of Justice continues to deliver fairly 
strongly worded judgments on the designation of conservation areas, including important 
judgments on the sufficiency of a Member State’s overall designation.  Thus the 
jurisprudence of the Court in relation to sites of conservation importance has moved 
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beyond judgments on whether individual sites should have been designated to ruling on 
whether Member States have designated a sufficient number of sites or total area for 
safeguarding measures to apply. cxxxvi  However, this approach tends to be followed where 
designation does not entail the ‘preservation’ of such areas, but allows economic 
considerations to be weighed when deciding on questions of land use.  By contrast, where 
designation ‘matters’, the Court has, at least in certain situations, shown a certain measure 
of flexibility towards Member State discretion.cxxxvii  Under the Directive on Agricultural 
Nitrates,cxxxviii for example, designation as a nitrate vulnerable zone requires the drawing 
up of action plans for the reduction and prevention of water pollution from nitrates and 
agricultural sources.  Hence in R v Secretary of State for the Environment and Minister of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte Standley and Metson the Court of Justice held 
that ‘Community law cannot provide precise criteria for establishing in each case whether 
the discharge of nitrogen compounds of agricultural origin makes a significant contribution 
to the pollution …. The Directive may thus be applied by the Member States in different 
ways’.cxxxix 
Finally in this context, there is a continued resistance to transferring inspection and day-to-
day enforcement powers to the EC level.  In part this is because of the loss of symbolic 
capital involvedcxl but no doubt it is also for the more pragmatic reason that EC-level 
inspection and enforcement may simply be too challenging a task.  Instead, the onus has 
so far been placed on other mechanisms and institutions such as the role of the European 
Environment Agency (in gathering information) and the EC Network for the Implementation 
and Enforcement of Environmental Law (IMPEL) (which promotes the exchange of 
information and expertise between regulators with a view to developing greater 
consistency in enforcement).  There is the prospect, however, of a Recommendation on 
minimum criteria for environmental inspections which would require Member States to 
draw up plans covering both routine monitoring of industrial activities regulated under 
Community environmental law, and non-routine follow-up inspections.cxli 
Thirdly, there has been less resort to a widening of the range of regulatory instruments 
than the Fifth Action Programme perhaps envisaged.  Although market-based instruments 
have emerged in relation to vehicle emissions and fuel quality,cxlii where voluntary 
agreements with the car industry have also been negotiated by the Commission,cxliii the 
wider use of economic instruments remains a vision rather than a reality.cxliv  Again for 
reasons related to symbolic capital, proposals for a carbon/energy tax, and revised 
proposals for an energy products tax, have stalled.cxlv A resurrection in response to the 
demands of climate change seems unlikely, with the flexibility of emissions trading, either 
between the Member States or, more likely, individual companies, emerging.cxlvi 
Finally, subsidiarity as a legal concept both fails to resolve fundamental issues about the 
allocation of responsibility and, as importantly, the framing of the kinds of questions that 
determine such decisions.cxlvii  While there have been improvements in the direction of 
wider public consultation on certain proposals, experience has been mixed.cxlviii  And 
current proposals continue to downplay public involvement after implementation, generally 
by adopting a technocratic approach to what are wider issues.cxlix  As Chalmers points out, 
opportunities for public participation in the key Directives on IPPC and environmental 
impact assessment come in only after the process of industry self-review has taken 




In this section, we consider the extent to which EC environmental law might be 
conceptualised within a framework drawn from the EU’s nascent attempt to carve out a 
European concept of citizenship.clii  Although much of this concept is currently a loose 
construction of free movement and equal treatment rights,cliii we examine the extent to 
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which EC law has begun to construct the EC ‘environmental’ citizen by the use of existing 
approaches and incremental development of generally-accepted citizenship claims.  
Attempts to develop the European environmental citizen, notably in relation to public 
participation, have often been driven by the need for greater enforcement of existing EC 
environmental law, long-recognised as a serious weakness.cliv  Furthermore, bolder 
proposals in this area, such as the formal entrenching of environmental ‘rights’ at the EU 
level, are addressed only at one understanding of the ‘environmental’ citizen.  By contrast, 
a more radical conception of ‘ecological’ citizenship may be advanced.  
 
‘Environmental’ Citizenship  
On the surface, there is little within the present formulation of citizenship as a concept of 
EU law that touches upon human-environment relations.  At best, perhaps, citizenship 
suggests either a restricted, residual view of the ‘market citizen’,clv or of a political citizen 
enjoying political rights through bonds of residence and not mere nationality.  On either 
approach, the interaction between the EU citizen and their environment is either indirect, 
through the market, or through a specific place or nation-centred participation in political 
life.  We can, however, consider EC environmental law by looking at various tendencies 
suggested by the concept of citizenship.clvi   
Environmental law continues to eschew a full-blown rights perspective,clvii and the 
Environmental Title of the EC Treaty continues to speak of ‘protecting the quality of the 
environment’clviii rather than adopting a rights-based discourse as found elsewhere in the 
Treaty in relation to social and economic policy.clix  Similarly, the environmental action 
programmes have never emphasised rights in the way that, for example, consumer policy 
has.clx  Environmental policy remains more programmatic in character, based generally on 
duties of result owed by the Member States.  Attempts during the 1996 IGC, both by 
Sweden and the Commission, to see a right of all citizens to a healthy environment 
inserted into the EC Treaty were unsuccessful,clxi although pressure for such a change 
may have been bought off only by the insertion of the new integration principle.clxii 
Grounding substantive environmental citizenship rights was again raised in the context of 
the latest IGC by environmental NGOs,clxiii and featured in discussion over the draft 
Charter of Fundamental Rights.clxiv  Although the legal status of the Charter has yet to be 
determined, the only explicit mention of the environment adds nothing to the approach 
already taken in Article 6 EC and no mention is made of environmental rights per se.clxv 
However, it must be doubted whether a legal right to environment, perhaps of the kind 
found in many national constitutions of Member States and accession countries, would 
operate at anything more than a policy level or provide anything more than symbolic 
capital.  While the European Court of Human Rights has, in extreme cases, worked 
creatively with the European Convention on Human Rights to provide remedies for flagrant 
instances of environmental injustice, it has done so necessarily within existing categories 
of the protection of rights and freedoms.clxvi  It remains to be seen whether abstractly-
formulated ‘rights’ in the context of the environment are useful, not least in relation to 
issues such as climate change and biodiversity conservation.  By contrast to human-
constructed concepts such as freedom of trade or the right to equal treatment and freedom 
from discrimination, the environment is both a social construct and a practical reality; 
necessarily, our interaction with the environment, in its infinite variety of forms and 
qualities, means a weighting of complex economic, social and cultural values in the setting 
of environmental standards.clxvii  As discussed above, so long as the objective is the 
integration of environment and economics through sustainable development, this requires 
some degree of resolution, rather than the ‘trump’ character of rights. 
Legislatively, there appears to be a modest expansion of procedural rights.  While access 
to EU documents is now provided for at Treaty level,clxviii revisions to key directives such 
as on environmental impact assessment and the control of major accident hazardsclxix 
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show an incremental enhancement of rights to information and participation.  In the case 
of the latter, for example, Member States are now required proactively to publicise 
information relating to the more hazardous installations covered.  Moreover, access to 
information (rather than merely access to documents) for any natural or legal person who 
so requests it follows the approach taken in the Directive on environmental information.clxx  
However, there is no fundamental change of approach from this Directive, namely to view 
procedural rights as facilitating enforcement, or at best enhancing transparency, rather 
than providing anything more free-standing.clxxi  These developments do little to challenge 
the framing of the EC’s democratic difficulties primarily as questions of the balancing of 
power between the institutions rather than as about the relationship of ‘citizens’ to these 
institutions.clxxii  
There are some signs of a greater role for citizen-type involvement in EC decision-making, 
such as the emergence of limited attempts to foster an environmental civil society through 
EC funding for environmental NGOs operating at the European level.clxxiii Again, though, 
such funding may primarily assist the Commission, at least indirectly, in its enforcement 
role.  In the same vein, the recent White Paper on Environmental Liability foresees a role 
for environmental NGOs, but only as a surrogate enforcement agency, generally where 
official action is not forthcoming.clxxiv  Where environmental NGOs have been given 
participatory rights at the level of EC decision-making, in practice these may be drowned 
out by the sound of industrial voices enjoying considerable numeric and other 
advantages.clxxv  Eventual implementation of the recently concluded 1998 Århus 
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters, though, may alter this significantly, providing a 
procedural complement to the more substantively-oriented but less environmentally-
relevant ECHR.  But so far the environmental citizen, while demonstrably active across 
Europe (as evidenced by direct action style protest) is generally a passive voice in EC 
environmental law and policy.clxxvi 
Perhaps the most interesting tangible developments in relation to environmental 
citizenship are taking place at judicial level. It is notable that the report of the European 
Court of Justice to the 1996 IGC specifically linked citizenship with its earlier creation of 
directly effective rights, suggesting that citizenship is to be seen substantively rather than 
merely in terms of procedural guarantees of political participation.clxxvii  As with legislative 
action, however, the underlying concern with ensuring greater enforcement is being 
reflected in a drift away from the view that Community legislation will only be reviewable 
under the direct effect doctrine where there is detriment to an individual right.  Thus, in two 
cases concerning the Directive on environmental assessment, the Court has held that 
what matters is the obligation on the Member State (or its competent authorities or even its 
courts) to take all the appropriate measures to ensure that the Directive is faithfully 
implemented in practice and that any discretion that a Member State has is not unduly 
exceeded.  In the Kraaijeveld case,clxxviii a case concerning the lack of assessment of the 
environmental effects of constructing dykes, the Court held that the Member States’ 
discretion in implementing the Directive in practice did not preclude judicial review of the 
question whether this discretion had been exceeded.  The Court emphatically directed 
national courts to examine national legislation to see whether the legislative authorities 
have remained within the limits of their lawful discretion.  The courts could therefore be 
obliged to set aside national legislation going beyond the limits of that discretion where 
they were bound to review the legality of national decision-making on their own motion.  
National authorities must then take all the measures necessary to ensure compliance with 
the Directive.  Writing extra-judicially about Kraaijeveld, at least one member of the Court 
(Judge Edward) has tried to make it clear that this did not mean that the Court found this 
part of the environmental assessment Directive to be directly effective, or confer individual 
rights (thus ruling out Francovich claims).clxxix  
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In the more recent Bozen case,clxxx the Court was asked to consider a challenge to a 
decision not to require an impact assessment for redevelopment at Bolzano airport.  The 
project would have changed the use of the airport from military to civilian and cargo flights, 
requiring some new development and intensifying effects from things like noise.  The 
Court followed the Kraaijeveld case in holding that the key test in relation to such projects 
was whether they were likely to have significant environmental effects because of their 
size, nature or location, and did not explore the issue as to whether the applicants had any 
right to bring the case.  Thus, while not holding that the Directive conferred directly 
effective rights on individuals where an authority in a Member State had exceeded its 
discretion, the Court provided a remedy for the applicants by, in effect, looking to the 
legality of the national decision-making procedure and the extent to which this, if 
unchecked, would detract from the effective implementation of the Directive.   
Opinions differ on what is happening here.  For some, following Judge Edward’s lead, the 
Court is constructing a new remedy through which non-implementation of directives can 
be checked without opening up the possibility of state liability claims (termed by one 
commentator ‘public law effect’).clxxxi  For others, the better view would probably be to see 
this as an expansion of the direct effect doctrine, in part because of the practical difficulties 
in giving effect to any wider public law effect doctrine.clxxxii  In practical terms, however, the 
result is little different; the notion that an individual right must be infringed for a provision to 
be directly effective, and that a right based on the protection of human health, or 
compensation for economic loss arising from environmental ‘harm’, must be at stake (as 
against, say, ‘interests’ relating to nature conservation)clxxxiii would seem to be being 
replaced by judicial mechanisms which look more towards the administrative duty that has 
been breached rather than the personal interests at stake.clxxxiv  What is clear is that 
concerns about non-implementation of Community environmental law have driven the 
Court of Justice away from a narrow, rights-based citizenship-type agenda, expanding at 
the same time the concept of environmental citizenship, although still from an enforcement 
perspective. 
A possible motivation behind the Court of Justice’s approach appears to be self-interest in 
preventing an expansion in the workload of the Court in new areas.  This is seen most 
clearly in the test for ‘direct and individual concern’ in Article 230 EC (ex Article 173), 
which the European Courts continue to interpret restrictively against individuals and 
environmental organisations, an interpretation which, perversely, operates so that the 
more widespread the environmental harm the stronger is the bar on legal recourse before 
the European Courts. This is the conclusion from Stichting Greenpeace Council, a 
challenge to the grant of regional assistance for the construction of two power stations in 
the Canary Islands.clxxxv  The dilemma might also be seen as an attempt on the part of the 
Court to fit broad environmental concerns (‘of general interest’) into a tightly defined legal 
category, originally drawn up with the protection of discrete and individualised financial 
interests in mind.  Nevertheless, the dissonance between seeking greater involvement of 
individuals and groups in the legislative process, whilst privileging the rights of only some 
of these participants in relation to the judicial interpretation or protection of the deals 
agreed, is striking, and of doubtful consistency with the requirements of the Århus 
Convention.clxxxvi  Outside of direct effect, the Court continues to be conspicuously inactive 
in the creative development of the procedural and participatory protections for individuals 
and groups seen elsewhere.clxxxvii  In practice, a further, related, difficulty, is that while a 
significant proportion (around one third) of ongoing enforcement action by the Commission 
relates to the environment, the Court is called upon comparatively rarely to rule on 
preliminary references in environmental matters, and when it does so these tend to be in 
cases brought by commercial rather than environmental concerns.clxxxviii  This has clear 
implications for the positive development of EC environmental law. 
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Towards ‘Ecological’ Citizenship? 
Like citizenship generally, environmental citizenship has tended to be conceptualised in 
terms of the claiming of entitlements in the public sphere.  These may be procedural rights 
of the kind discussed above, or more substantive rights to an environment of a ‘clean’, 
‘decent’ or ‘healthy’ quality, framed anthropocentrically for humans.clxxxix  Theoretically, the 
exercise is often seen as expanding citizenship claims outwards from civic, political and 
social rights to ‘third-generation’ solidarity or collective rights such as environmental rights.  
Because EC law is an implicit rejection of ecological thought, however, an ecological 
perspective on citizenship arguably leads not to a ‘mainstreaming’ of EC environmental 
law but rather provides a ‘disruptive challenge to traditional notions of citizenship’, one 
which looks ‘outside the city, beyond the public, and further afield than the nation-state’.cxc 
Various possibilities flow from taking an ecological citizenship perspective which, taking a 
duties-centred approach, is not based on a contract between the state and its members.cxci  
Rather, we might consider EC environmental law as positing a conception of ecological 
citizenship neither wedded to the nation-state in space nor in time, nor wholly concerned 
with activities in the public sphere.  Clearly, such an ecological citizenship poses a 
challenge even to the conceptions of citizenship that can be derived, immanently, from 
existing political, economic and social rights at EU level. 
Initially, a duties-based approach is increasingly being pursued by commentators 
frustrated at attempts at ascribing environmental rights (and also ‘rights to the 
environment’ itself).cxcii  Moreover, duties-centred approaches can be found in some 
national constitutions of Member States, including duties both on individuals (e.g., the 
Spanish Constitution) and on government (e.g., the Dutch Constitution)).  From an 
ecological perspective, a duties-based approach emphasises a degree of virtue, and an 
attitude towards the natural environment, and avoids any necessary connection with 
rights.  By definition, environmental duties, owed across physical and spatial borders, 
cannot be based on reciprocity.cxciii  
As far as law is concerned, three issues emerge in relation to duties. We might ask to 
whom a particular duty is owed, since this will be important for enforcement.  Who has the 
correlative right to any duty placed either on the Commission or the Member States or on 
individuals?  In Enichem Base, for example, the Court of Justice held that the 
Commission, not the Member State, had the correlative right in respect of reporting 
obligations in the waste framework Directive.cxciv  However, it has been queried whether 
the same approach should be taken in a situation similar to that in the Stitching 
Greenpeace case, at least if the geographic nexus is sufficient to establish a right.cxcv  
Further, there may be greater flexibility in relation to transposing duties than rights; an 
obligation to prohibit an environmentally-damaging activity can generally be transposed 
either by criminal, civil or administrative mechanisms, and even within any of these 
categories there will generally be flexibility as to the degree of obligation, e.g., as between 
strict or fault-based liability.  Finally, EC law can, directly or indirectly, regulate or stimulate 
private behaviour.  There is, after all, much in the belief that ‘from an ecological point of 
view, good citizenship is learnt in private, not in public’.cxcvi  At least insofar as there is 
freedom in the domestic sphere (e.g., consumption and disposal) good ecological 
behaviour may be learnt in the private realm.  EC law may further this aspect of ecological 
citizenship to the extent that such areas (waste; product labelling) are sites of legitimate 
EC involvement. 
In relation to space, loosening the bonds between the citizen and the nation-state poses 
many of the same issues as the subsidiarity and flexibility debates, namely the legitimate 
extent of involvement in environmental and related affairs across Member State 
borders.cxcvii  Some strides have been made here, such as the revised Directive on 
environmental impact assessment which requires public consultation within other Member 
States which may experience significant environmental effects from developments outwith 
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their borders.cxcviii  There is also some judicial support for the sufficiency of a geographic 
nexus in relation to enforcement proceedings under Article 230 EC.cxcix  Here, it might be 
noted that there is little citizenship-type involvement in relation to the external aspects of 
EC environmental law.  To take trade as an example, a centralised approach prevails and, 
in cases where science is not the determinative discourse, a centralised view of 
institutionalised caution may dominate.cc  In general terms, there is much of an ecological 
nature that could usefully emerge from a European public space.cci 
A further approach is through the concept of a common European natural heritage, 
discussed above.  Although complex, the development of this concept may parallel the 
case of the free movement of persons in so far as there is evident a similar process of 
freeing legal action from an economic trigger in the interests of higher, aspirational ideas 
of citizenship arising from deeper integration in Europe.  In a similar manner, we can see 
the flourishing of a more autonomous body of environmental law which, although bounded 
by economic considerations, is not attached umbilically to the single market.  Ideas of a 
common natural heritage in Europe, whose articulation is symbolic and marginal to the 
conservation directives it underpins,ccii ought therefore to elevate the relationship between 
community and environment to a higher plane, in the process creating a more direct 
connection between individuals and the environment.  Without suggesting that such an 
approach is free from difficulties, articulated and generally accepted ecological duties,cciii 
owed non-specifically across space and time, might avoid some of the difficulties inherent 
in what has been coined the ‘psychic spillover’ justification to EC environmental law, 
whereby issues of ‘mere’ concern to citizens in one Member State might justify regulating 
action in other Member States.cciv 
 
Conclusion 
European environmental law contributes to the construction of its subject by defining ‘the 
environment’ and drawing its boundaries; in this process it universalises its subject matter 
and plays an important symbolic role in the process of European integration.  According to 
the Treaty, and increasingly in practice, sustainable development now provides the 
organising idea, or central reference point, not just for environmental law and policy but for 
all Community activities.  Further legal principles (integration primarily, but also 
subsidiarityccv) elaborate and give further expression to it.  From a legal point of view, the 
process of ‘mainstreaming’ sustainable development and the other associated principles 
may lead to the application of legal doctrines and principles from social and economic 
policy areas to the environmental field.  However, invoking law for environmental 
protection still raises problems peculiar to it.  The broader issue is that, whilst locating 
principles of environmental law within mainstream EC law may provide a functional fit with 
the requirements of sustainable development, the essential and unique quality of 
environmental concern and thought might be lost, not the least of which are concerns 
relating to process and to identity which even the evolution of a type of European 
‘environmental’ citizenship may neither capture nor replace. 
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behind individual Member States agreeing to this development, see especially J. Golub, ‘British 
Sovereignty and the Development of EC Environmental Policy’ (1996) 5 Environmental Politics 700. 
vii
  For a strong view of ‘ecological law’, and a useful overview of the differences between 
environmental an ecological law see D. Wilkinson, ‘Using Environmental Ethics to Create 
Ecological Law’ in J. Holder and D. McGillivray (eds) Locality and Identity: Environmental Issues in 
Law and Society (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999).  See also n 36 below. 
viii
  See generally D. Robinson and J. Dunkley, Public Interest Perspectives in Environmental Law 
(London: Wiley Chancery, 1995); C. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?, and Other Essays on 
Law, Morals and the Environment, 25th anniversary ed. (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1996); Holder 
and McGillivray, n 7 above; S. Bell and D. McGillivray, Ball and Bell on Environmental Law 
(London: Blackstone Press, 2000), esp. ch 2; and see also text at n 000 below. 
ix
 See, similarly, Z. Bankowski and E. Christodoulidis, ‘The European Union as an Essentially 
Contested Project’ (1998) 4 European Law Journal 341. 
x
  European Environment Agency, Environment in the European Union at the Turn of the Century 
(EEA, 1999), p.9 et seq. 
xi
  These report that production and consumption look set to increase, with resultant increases of 
pollution and waste.  The forecast, using a baseline, ‘business as usual’ scenario shows continued 
pressure on Europe’s environment, European Environment Agency, ibid.  See also the previous 
‘Dobris’ and ‘Dobris II’ assessments (Europe’s Environment: the Dobris Assessment (EEA, 1995) 
and Europe’s Environment: the Second Assessment (EEA, 1998).  Prior to the EEA, the 
Commission prepared a number of less sophisticated reports. 
xii
 European Environment Agency, Report on the European Environment at the Turn of the Century, 
n 10 above, 2. This Report provides an assessment of the ‘development of environmental quality in 
the EU in the near future, i.e. 2010’.  The forecasts of environmental quality in various sectors, for 
example greenhouse gases and climate change, hazardous substances, soil degradation and 
‘water stress’ are summarised by means of icons, showing either smiley faces, non-smiley faces or 
frowns.  Each of the sectors listed above are portrayed by ‘frowns’. 
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xiii
 Although see Commission Communication on Sustainable Urban Development in the European 
Union: A Framework for Action, COM(1998) 605 final. 
xiv
 On the indoor environment, see E. Shove, ‘Threats and Defences in the Built Environment’ in S. 
Elworthy et al (eds) Perspectives on the Environment 2 (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995). 
xv
 On spatial scales and environmental thought, see David Harvey, Justice, Nature and the 
Geography of Difference (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
xvi
 For example, as a result of climate change; see P. D. Moore, B. Chaloner and P. Stott, Global 
Environmental Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), ch.7; Wilkinson, ‘Plants on the Move’ 119 New 
Scientist (1999), 1 (Inside Science) 
xvii
 A more tentative, but possibly more valuable, meaning may be suggested: ‘“Environment” is ... 
whatever surrounds or, to be more precise, whatever exists in the surroundings of some being that 
is relevant to the state of that being at a particular place and time.  The “situatedness” of a being 
and its internal conditions and needs have as much to say about the definition of environment as 
the surrounding conditions themselves, while the criteria of relevance can also vary widely.’ Harvey, 
n 15 above, 118. 
xviii
 For example, P. Macnaghten and J. Urry, Contested Natures (London: Sage, 1998). 
xix
 Environmental Signals 2000, available at http://themes.eea.eu.int/binary/s/signals2000.pdf 
xx
  Proposals for a Sixth Environment Action Programme have been published as 'Environment 
2010: Our future, Our choice', COM(2001) 31 final, and include proposals for the use of 
environmental indicators (see para. 8.2).  See further n 66 below.  Community environmental law 
has been based on Environmental Action Programmes since 1973. 
xxi
 COM(92)22 final, and see Council Resolution of 1 February 1993 on a Community programme of 
policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable development (OJ C138 17.5.93 p1). 
xxii
 See Quality of Life Counts (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 
December 1999), which includes crime statistics alongside indicators relating to air and water 
quality and other ‘environmental’ indicators, following on from A Better Quality of Life: A Strategy for 
Sustainable Development in the United Kingdom, Cm 4345, 1999. 
xxiii
  See e.g. the dispute over whether the UK indicator for greenhouse gas emission reductions 
should be at ‘green’ (Quality of Life Counts, ibid) or ‘red’ (UK Round Table on Sustainable 
Development, Indicators of Sustainable Development, May 2000). 
xxiv
 According to ideas of bioregionalism, the jurisdictions of national, and supranational 
governments match poorly with these areas, and so makes environmental governance difficult.  
That ‘Europe’ is not a single bioregion should create similar difficulties, however, in a contradictory 
fashion, European environmental policy has relied on the fit between the transboundary nature of 
environmental pollution and cross-border controls for its legitimacy. 
xxv
 For example, see the Commission Opinion on the motorway which intersects the Trebel and 
Recknitz Valley, OJ 1995, C178/3, discussed in A. Nollkaemper, ‘Habitat Protection in European 
Community Law: Evolving Conceptions of a Balance of Interests’ (1997) 9 Journal of Environmental 
Law 271.  The European Environment Agency report, Environment in Europe at the Turn of the 
Century, n 10 above, documents the likely environmental effects of EU enlargement.  Some 
accession countries have more environmentally sustainable economic activities and also more 
extensive areas of natural habitats.  In the transition to EU membership there is a danger that ‘their’ 
environment will suffer if they follow the same development path of the existing members. 
xxvi
 On 14 February 2000 negotiating Directives were adopted in Council under which all accession 
States are admitted to the European Environment Agency; on the negotiations see 
http://org.eea.eu.int/news.shtml.  For judicial consideration of the extent of the European territory of 
the Member States in an environmental context see R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 
ex parte Greenpeace (No. 2) [2000] Env LR 221. 
xxvii
 See, e.g., Council Directive 83/189/EEC on seal pups (OJ 1983, L91/30), Council Regulation 
348/81/EEC on the import of whales and other cetacean products (OJ 1981 L39/1), and Council 
Regulation 3254/91/EEC on leghold traps (OJ 1991, L308/1). 
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xxviii
 Although a balance between these two concerns has now been placed on a legislative footing 
by the adoption of Council Directive 91/676/EEC on the protection of waters against pollution 
caused by nitrates from agricultural sources (OJ 1991, L375/1). 
xxix
 See, for example, the emphasis in Council Directive 91/271/EEC (OJ 1991, L135/40) on urban 
waste water treatment on dispersal rates.  This extends to the judgments of the Court of Justice, in 
which it has interpreted directives with an ‘environmental’ objective in such a way as to suggest that 
their primary focus is human health.  For example, in Case C-298/95 Commission v Germany 
[1996] ECR I-6747, Council Directive 78/659/EEC on freshwater fish waters (OJ 1978, L222/1) was 
interpreted in such a way since the species of fish covered were edible, notwithstanding that there 
is no authority for this in the Directive and that the Directive is classified by the EC as a 
conservation measure (see http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/index.html).  Arguably, the preamble is 
one of the first examples (at least in Community water law) where the ecological foundations for a 
Directive are stressed ahead of, or at least alongside, competition concerns. 
xxx
 Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild flora and fauna 
(OJ 1992, L206/7). 
xxxi
 See Art. 6 of the Habitats Directive, ibid. This compares with a stricter approach to habitat 
protection under Council Directive 79/409/EEC on the conservation of wild birds (OJ 1979, L103/1), 
the key provision of which (Article (4)) is now repealed by the Habitats Directive. 
xxxii
 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, 1972), 
Principle 1: ‘Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate condition of life, in an 
environment of quality that permits a life of dignity and well being....’ 
xxxiii
 See discussion of ex Article 235 EEC (now Art. 308 EC) as an ‘elastic clause’ in J. Weiler, ‘The 
Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2403, 2443-2447. 
xxxiv
 The Single European Act 1986 inserted a Title on the Environment in the EC Treaty.  The 
Single European Act was concerned with environmental protection because of the distorting effects 
of differing national environmental laws on competition and intra-Community trade.  A further 
influence was the likelihood of environmental harm caused by increased transportation, industrial 
restructuring and enhanced economic growth accompanying fulfilment of the internal market.  
Environmental policy, alongside social policy, came to be regarded by the Commission as a 
‘flanking’ policy to complement the internal market.  See Haigh and Baldock, Environmental Policy 
and 1992 (IEEP, 1992). We see, therefore, a non-linear development of EC environmental law - i.e. 
a corrective mechanism for the excesses of economic development.  This might be compared with 
the more marginal use of ‘free-standing’ measures such as the Wild Birds Directive, Seal Pups 
Directive etc. prior to the insertion of the Environment Title in the EC Treaty 1986. 
xxxv
 For example, the Directive on wild birds, particularly the sixth recital: ‘[W]hereas the 
conservation of the species of wild birds naturally occurring in the European territory of the Member 
States is necessary to attain, within the operation of the common market, of the Community’s 
objectives regarding the improvement of living conditions, a harmonious development of economic 
activities throughout the Community and balanced expansion, but the necessary specific powers to 
act have not been provided by the Treaty;’. 
xxxvi
 Weiler, n 33 above. 
xxxvii
 The recent Council Directive 99/31/EC on landfill (OJ 1999, L182/1) does not address historic 
land contamination, and Council Directive 80/68/EEC on the protection of groundwater (OJ 1980, 
L20/43), which extends to indirect discharges to groundwater from disposal or tipping, only applies 
prospectively (Art. 5). The Commission’s 1996 waste strategy expressed the view that remediation 
of such sites should be a matter primarily for the Member States (COM(96)399). 
xxxviii
 Both of these areas, land development, or town and country planning, and energy persist in 
requiring unanimity in the Council, as do primarily fiscal measures (Art. 175(2) EC).  Community 
competence is only implied through the statement of this fact in the Treaty.  A proposed Directive 
on strategic environmental assessment of plans and programmes will, if adopted, impact upon the 
structure of decision-making in Member States’ land development systems (see n 40 below and 
further text at n 97 below).  
xxxix
 See further A. Dobson, Green Political Thought (Routledge, 1995), 2nd ed., ch. 1. 
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xl
  On proposals for strategic environmental assessment see COM(96)511 and COM(99)73.  SEA 
can be seen as the paradigm far-reaching legal instrument affecting the nature and culture of high-
level decision-making across numerous and disparate policy areas.  The Council formally adopted 
a common position on 30 March 2000 (see http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/eia/sea-
legalcontext.htm) and political agreement on a directive is expected in spring 2001 (see 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/eia/sea-legalcontext.htm#compos).  See also text at n 97 
below.  
xli
   See e.g. Scott, n 2 above, ch.1 and Hilson, n 2 above, ch.000. 
xlii
 N. Walker, ‘Sovereignty and Differentiated Integration in the European Union’, (1998) 4 European 
Law Journal 355, at 359. 
xliii
  See Council Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the effects on the environment of 
certain public and private projects (OJ 1985, L175/40) as amended by Council Directive 97/11/EC 
(OJ 1997, L73/5), Art. 7; Council Directive 96/62 on ambient air quality assessment and 
management (OJ 1997, L296/55), Art. 8(6); Council Directive 96/82/EC on major accident hazards 
(OJ 1997, L10/13), Art. 13; and Council Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a framework for 
Community action in the field of water policy (OJ 2000, L375/1), esp. Arts 11, 13 and 15. 
xliv
 Council Directive 779/80/EEC on sulphur dioxide and suspended particles (OJ 1980, L229/30). 
See, e.g., Case C-361/88, Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-2567. 
xlv
 K. Gray, ‘Equitable Property’ (1994) 47 Current Legal Problems 157, 206-207. 
xlvi
 See further text at n 000 below. 
xlvii
 Case C-44/95 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte RSPB [1996] ECR I-3805 
(‘Lappel Bank’) at para. 23.  The Court of Justice recounted the third recital of the Birds Directive 
which declares that migratory species ‘constitute a common heritage’ and that ‘effective bird 
protection is typically a trans-frontier environment problem entailing common responsibilities’.  See 
also Case C-339/87 Commission v Netherlands [1990] ECR I-851 in which the Court similarly 
speaks of ‘common heritage’. 
xlviii
 Case C-44/95, ibid, per Advocate General Fennelly. 
xlix
 Case C-169/89 van den Berg [1990] ECR I-2143 at 2165.  This ‘localist’ approach however was 
not not fully adopted by A-G van Gerven, who favoured the argument that the Directive supplied a 
legitimate basis for restricting trade in the birds because of the “transfrontier nature of the protection 
of birds” (at 2155)  
l
 Emphasis added. 
li
 Joined Cases C-164/97 and C-165/97 Parliament v Council [1999] ECR I-1139, para. 16: ‘the 
natural heritage represented by forest ecosystems’. See also Council Resolution of 15 December 
1998 on a forestry strategy for the European Union (OJ 1999, C56/1), which eschews the use of 
‘common heritage’ language. 
lii
 Article B of Title 1 of the Treaty on European Union. 
liii
 World Commission on Environment and Development (The Brundtland Report), Our Common 
Future, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 8.  On the evolution of sustainable development as 
a legal concept see T. Jewell and J. Steele, ‘UK Regulatory Reform and the Pursuit of Sustainable 
Development’ (1996) Journal of Environmental Law.283; Elworthy and Holder, n 6 above, ch 4; J. 
Alder and D. Wilkinson, Environmental Law and Ethics (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 136-140 
and ch 6; Kiss and Shelton, n 2 above, ch. 2. 
liv
 Most notably, in the Declaration to the 1992 Rio ‘Earth Summit’ and in Agenda 21. 
lv
 These organisations presented proposals for strengthening the environmental dimension of the 
EC Treaty in Greening the Treaty II: Sustainable Development in a Democratic Union, Proposals for 
the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference.  See further N. Haigh, ‘Introducing the Concept of 
Sustainable Development into the Treaties of the European Union’ in T. O’Riordan and H. Voisey 
(eds), The Transition to Sustainability: The Politics of Agenda 21 in Europe (London: Earthscan, 
1998).  See also I. Christie, Sustaining Europe: A Common Cause for the European Union in the 
New Century (London: Demos/Green Alliance, 1999). 
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lvi
  See W. Beckerman, ‘Sustainable Development: Is It a Useful Concept?’ (1994) 3 Environmental 
Values 191; M. Jacobs, ‘Sustainable Development, Capital Substitution and Economic Humility: A 
Response to Beckerman’ (1995) 4 Environmental Values 57; H.E. Daly ‘On Wilfred Beckerman’s 
Critique of Sustainable Development’ (1995) 4 Environmental Values.49; M. Redclift, Sustainable 
Development: Exploring the Contradictions (London: Routledge, 1989).  On justice dimensions in 
particular see A. Dobson (ed.) Fairness and Futurity: Essays on Environmental Sustainability and 
Social Justice (Oxford: OUP, 1999) and A. Dobson, Justice and the Environment: Conceptions of 
Environmental Sustainability and Dimensions of Justice (Oxford: OUP, 1998). 
lvii
 Brundtland Report, n 53 above, 8: ‘...aspects of technology and social organization can be both 
managed and improved to make way for a new era of economic growth’. 
lviii
 For a more thorough account, see M. Hajer, The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological 
Modernisation and the Policy Process (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). For an overview see A. 
Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy (Oxford: Polity Press, 1998), 000. 
lix
 For example, the inclusion of broad social policy objectives such as the anti-discrimination 
principle in Article 13 EC (ex Art. 6a).  This might be compared with the narrowly drawn principle of 
equality in Article 119 of the original Treaty of Rome (now Art. 141 EC) on equality between men 
and women in matters of pay for work.   
lx
 e.g. Case C-44/95 (‘Lappel Bank’), n 47 above, in which the Court of Justice held that economic 
considerations can not influence the decision to designate an area for special protection for the 
purposes of the Wilds Birds Directive.  See also Case C-371/98 R v Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex parte First Corporate Shipping Ltd, Opinion of A.-G. 
Léger, 7 Mar. 2000, judgment of the Court 7 November 200, that economic considerations must be 
precluded when Member States draw up lists of candidate special areas of conservation under 
art.4(1) of the Habitats Directive, n 30 above.  See also notes 71 and 77 below. 
lxi
 ‘Sustainable and non-inflationary growth’ is no longer expressly linked to or qualified by 
‘respecting the environment’.  Also, the separate task of promoting the development of economic 
activities must now be ‘sustainable’ as well as harmonious and balanced.  A new task of promoting 
a ‘high level of environmental protection and improvement of the quality of the environment’ is also 
inserted. 
lxii
 Council Regulation 722/97/EC (OJ 1997, L108/1) which refers to ‘sustainable development’ 
without directly defining it. 
lxiii
 Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) 2493/2000 on measures to promote the full integration 
of the environmental dimension in the development process of developing countries (OJ 2000, 
L288/1) Art. 2 (emphasis added). 
lxiv
 Article 174(1) EC. 
lxv
 See also the Partnership Agreement between the African Caribbean and Pacific States and the 
European Community and its Member States, non official and provisional version [ref to follow] 
lxvi
 See n 20 above. In Case C-142/95P Associazone agricoltori della provincia di Rovigo and 
Others v Commission [1996] ECR I-6669 the Court of Justice held that this action programme does 
not lay down any legal rules of a mandatory nature but provides merely a framework for the defining 
and implementing of Community environmental policy: ‘For each of the main issues, long-term 
objectives are given as an indication of the sense of direction or thrust to be applied in the pursuit of 
sustainable development, certain targets are indicated for the period up to the year 2000 and a 
representative selection of actions is prescribed with a view to achieving the said targets.  These 
objectives and targets do not constitute legal commitments but, rather, performance levels or 
achievements to be aimed at now in the interests of attaining a sustainable development path’, 
point 12, Summary, Fifth Action Programme.  This general approach is unlikely to change with the 
6th Environmental Action Programme, see n 20 above.  Importantly, the Court was not asked, and 
did not take the opportunity to explore, the extent to which Towards Sustainability (64-70) looks to a 
broad range of instruments (economic, procedural, information-based etc) as necessary to achieve 
sustainability. 
lxvii
 See n 43 above. 
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lxviii
 E.g. Case C-72/95 BV Aannemersbedrijf PK Kraaijeveld and Others v Gedeputeerde Staten van 
Zuid-Holland [1996] ECR I-5403.   
lxix
 For example New Zealand v France, ICJ Rep. 1995, 288, dissenting opinions of Judges Koroma, 
Palmer and Weeramantry.  Judge Palmer advocates the recognition of environmental limits, 
including the calculus of risk via such mechanisms as environmental assessment, ‘otherwise the 
paradigm of sustainable development enhanced by the world at the Rio Conference cannot be 
achieved’ (para. 68).  See also Case concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hungary/Slovakia) (1998) 37 ILM 162 per Judge Weeramantry, who argues that sustainable 
development is not merely a concept but a recognised principle of customary international law, 
albeit one which suggests procedural rather than substantive obligations. 
 lxx
 See generally the Fifth Environmental Action Programme, Towards Sustainability, s 7. 
lxxi
 See n 60 above. 
lxxii
  See Case C-57/89 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-883 (‘Leybucht Dykes’); Case C-
355/90 Commission v Spain [1993] ECR I-4221 (‘Santoña Marshes’); Case C-44/95 R v Secretary 
of State for the Environment, ex parte RSPB (Lappel Bank, n 54 above).  It is notable that under the 
Birds Directive, designation is a task solely for the Member States. 
lxxiii
 Although a key aspect of the principle, the integration principle, included in the Environment Title 
since 1986, may be seen as a precursor to sustainable development.  See further below. 
lxxiv
 As proposed by the European Consultative Forum on the Environment and Sustainable 
Development (the European Commission’s ‘stakeholders’ advisory forum on environment and 
sustainability).  
lxxv
 For example, consumer protection (Art. 153(2)), public health (Art. 152(1)) and culture (Art. 
151(4)). 
lxxvi
  For example, the central concern of the Brundtland Report was the increasing globalisation of 
various crises (environmental, developmental, energy, etc), and the connections between them.  As 
it memorably put it: ‘They are all one’. This, of course, can be taken more narrowly than stronger 
theses relating to the connectedness of all life, on which see most famously B. Commoner, The 
Closing Circle (London: Cape, 1972). 
lxxvii
 This has been explicitly recognised by A-G Léger, see n 60 above: ‘Integration of the 
environmental dimension is thus the basis of the strategy of sustainable development…’. 
lxxviii
 See generally Scott, n 2 above, ch 7. 
lxxix
 Case 302/86 Commission v Denmark [1988] ECR 4607 (‘Danish Bottles’).  More recently see 
Case C-389/96, Aher-Waggon GmbH v Germany [1998] ECR I-4473. 
lxxx
 Case C-67/97, Criminal proceedings against Bluhme [1998] ECR I-8033.  For a useful review of 
the case law to Bluhme see H. Temmink, ‘From Danish Bottles to Danish Bees: The Dynamics of 
Free Movement of Goods and Environmental Protection – a Case Law Analysis’ (2000) 1 Yearbook 
of European Environmental Law 61. 
lxxxi
 P. Sands, ‘The European Court of Justice: An Environmental Tribunal?’ in H. Somsen (ed.) 
Protecting the European Environment: Enforcing EC Environmental Law (London: Blackstone, 
1996).  See further text at n 000 below. 
lxxxii
  On which see most notably the insertion, under the Treaty of Amsterdam, of the requirement 
that measures under the internal market environmental guarantee should not amount to “an 
obstacle to the functioning of the internal market”, and criticism of the nebulousness of this: R. 
Macrory, ‘Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty: The Environment’ in O’Keefe and Twomey (eds) 
Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000); H. Sevenster, ‘The 
Environmental Guarantee After Amsterdam: Does the Emperor have New Clothes?’ (2000) 
Yearbook of European Environmental Law 291. 
lxxxiii
 C. Harding, ‘Who Goes to Court in Europe? An Analysis of Litigation against the European 
Community’ (1992) 17 European Law Review 105; C. Harding and B. Swart (ed.), Enforcing 
European Community Rules: Criminal Proceedings, Administrative Procedures and Harmonization 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996); Chalmers, n 2 above; Jans, n 188 below. 
Kent Academic Repository – Kent Law School 
Published version available in ’20 Yearbook of European Law 139-171’ 
- 23 - 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
lxxxiv
 Article 130r(2) EEC: ‘...Environmental protection requirements should be a component of the 
Community's other policies’. 
lxxxv
 Article 130r(2) EC Treaty: ‘...Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the 
definition and implementation of other Community policies’. 
lxxxvi
 Article 6 EC: ‘Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of the Community's policies and activities referred to in Article 3, particularly with a 
view to promoting sustainable development’.  See further Macrory, n 82 above.  
lxxxvii
 M. Hession and R. Macrory, ‘The Legal Duty of Environmental Integration: Commitment and 
Obligation or Enforceable Right?’ in T. O’Riordan and H. Voisey (eds) The Transition to 
Sustainability: The Politics of Agenda 21 in Europe (London: Earthscan, 1998). 
lxxxviii
 The conclusion of the Court of Justice in Case C-62/88, Parliament v Council [1990] ECR I-
1527 (‘Chernobyl I’) was that the integration principle in its pre-Maastricht version implies that ‘all 
community measures must satisfy the requirements of environmental protection’ has been taken as 
hinting at ‘more than a mere enabling provision’ (Hession and Macrory, ibid). 
lxxxix
 Notwithstanding the Opinion of Advocate General Cosmas in Case C-321/95P Stichting 
Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) and others v Commission [1998] 3 CMLR 1 who 
was prepared to find that the integration principle was capable of direct effect, although the Court of 
Justice was silent on this point. Contrast transport policy: Case C13/83 Parliament v Council [1985] 
ECR 1513.s 
xc
 For example, in Case C-300/89 Commission v Council (Titanium Dioxide) [1991] ECR I-2867 the 
Court of Justice considered that the principle of integration implied that ‘a Community measure 
cannot be covered by Article 130s merely because it also pursues objectives of environmental 
protection’. 
xci
 Hession and Macrory, n 87 above. 
xcii
 See The Cologne Report on Environmental Integration: Mainstreaming of Environmental Policy, 
SEC(99)777. 
xciii
 For example, Strengthening Environmental Integration within Community Energy Policy, 
COM(98)571 final, Indicators for the Integration of Environmental Concerns into the Common 
Agricultural Policy, COM(2000)20 final, Single Market and Environment, COM(99)263 final. 
xciv
 Partnership for Integration - A Strategy for Integrating Environment into European Union 
Policies, COM(98) 333 final.  
xcv
 G. van Calster and K. Deketelaere, ‘Amsterdam, the Intergovernmental Conference and 
Greening the EU Treaty’, (1998) 7 European Environmental Law Review 12 at 18.  On ‘Greening 
Government’ see Bell and McGillivray, n 8 above, 000. 
xcvi
 OJ 1999, L160/80. 
xcvii
 See n 40 above. See recital 3: ‘...environmental assessment is an important tool in integrating 
environmental considerations into such plans and programmes because it ensures that the relevant 
authorities take account of the likely environmental effects of implementing plans and programmes 
prior to their adoption’. 
xcviii
 Declaration 12 Treaty of Amsterdam, strengthening Declaration 20 Treaty of Maastricht. 
xcix
 Directive 96/61/EC, OJ 1996, L257/26. 
c
 S. Beckwith and J. Thornton, Environmental Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1997), 142 
ci
 See n 43 above. 
cii
 See also, despite its voluntary nature, Council Regulation 1836/93/EEC on environmental 
management and audit (OJ 1993, L168/1) and calls for guidance, rather than legislation, on 
integrated coastal zone management (Towards a European Integrated Coastal Zone Management 
(ICZM) Strategy: General Principles and Policy Options; Lessons from the European Commission's 
Demonstration Programme on Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM), both April 1999, and 
Towards a European Union Strategy for Integrated Coastal Zone Management, Seminar, Brussels, 
2 July 1999. 
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ciii
 E. Klatte, ‘The Principle of Integration After 25 Years of Community Environmental Policy’ (1999) 
3 and 4 Law and European Affairs 370.  
civ
 W. Sheate, ‘From Environmental Impact Assessment to Strategic Environmental Assessment: 
Sustainability and Decision-Making’ in J. Holder (ed.), The Impact of EC Environmental Law in the 
United Kingdom (London: Wiley, 1997).  See also Commission Opinion (EC) 96/15, OJ 1996, L6/14 
and draft Opinion  95/C OJ C78, p3 on the dissonance between transport and nature conservation 
objectives. 
cv
 D. Baldock et al, The Integration of Environmental Protection Requirements into the Definition 
and Implementation of Other EC Policies (IEEP, 1992). 
cvi
  Macrory, n 82 above, 174-175. 
cvii
 ‘The Community shall take action relating to the environment to the extent to which the 
objectives … can be attained better at Community level than at the level of individual Member 
States’. 
cviii
 Whether this takes ‘situatedness’ seriously must be doubted. 
cix
 Golub, n 6 above, 714. 
cx
  de Búrca, ‘Reappraising Subsidiarity’s Significance after Amsterdam’, Harvard Jean Monnet 
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